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Peak-Load Pricing in Portland: 
Theory, Application, and Recommendations for 




In order to make good microeconomic policy in the public sector, non-rivalrous 
goods and joint costs need to be addressed. One field where non-rivalrous goods 
and joint costs are important to consider is in the economics of peak-load pricing 
and transportation policy. This concept is often applied to electrical utilities, but 
not often applied as a way to relieve the burden of downtown traffic congestion 
during peak traffic times or to increase city revenues. This paper discusses the 
theory of peak-load pricing as it applies to “central business districts” (CBDs). It 
demonstrates successful and unsuccessful examples of peak-flow pricing in CBDs 
in other cities, including how the private costs of driving interact with potentially 
implementing a policy, and how politics play a role in implementing peak-load 
pricing policies. Finally, it discusses current transportation policies in Portland, 
Oregon, and recommends the city implement a congestion pricing policy. 
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INTRODUCTION: NON-RIVALROUS GOODS AND JOINT COSTS 
 
City officials need to have a plan to reduce the negative effects of traffic congestion 
and the environmental externalities of an entire population commuting throughout 
a city. Because urban centers have grown astronomically in the land-wealthy 
United States, traffic congestion and its impact on the environment and even equity 
have become an increasing issue in the U.S. Public policy is necessary to mitigate 
these issues. 
 When working within the realm of public policy, it is important that the 
study of economics addresses the issue of non-rivalrous goods. Roads provide a 
place for cars to drive all the time, but they are utilized differently depending on 
the time of day. Peak traffic times see higher congestion, while off-peak times see 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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lower congestion.1 If we continue to use this division of traffic times, we can 
consider them to be non-rivalrous goods because “an increase or decrease in the 
amount of [road] used to provide one … does not change the amount of [road] 
available to supply the other.”2 In other words, it does not matter how much road is 
used, but simply that roads exist during both peak and off-peak traffic times.  
   
Another important concept to understand with the idea of peak traffic times 
and off-peak traffic times is the idea of joint costs. Essentially, joint costs occur 
“when two or more discrete outputs are made from some of the same inputs.”3 For 
example, traffic happens during peak times and off-peak times, but roads are 
nevertheless used for cars (and other vehicles) during both times. Furthermore, “the 
problem is deducing whether the marginal cost of an output is greater or less than 
its marginal benefit.”4 How do you decide if the roads have a greater benefit during 
peak times or off-peak times? They clearly benefit cars all the time. One way to 
address the issue of joint costs is simply to add up the marginal benefits and then 
compare them to the marginal costs.5 
 
 When utilizing roads, drivers in much of the United States are shielded from 
the full marginal social costs of driving. They also often underestimate the private 
costs of driving. Economists have advocated for a long time for drivers to pay the 
marginal costs of using highways, though it has been politically unpopular until 
relatively recently.6 In this paper, I will walk through the theoretical model of peak-
load pricing and how it might apply to a central business district (CBD). A peak-
load pricing model would require drivers to share the marginal costs of driving 
during peak traffic times. Then I will describe how such a policy might work, give 
examples, and explain the private costs of driving in more detail. Finally, I offer 
my recommendations for how and when to implement a peak-load pricing policy 
in Portland, Oregon. For the purposes of this report, we will assume that all non-
public motorized vehicles would count equally, and that roads would be priced 
depending on location and typical congestion patterns. 
 
 
1. Anastasios Charisis, Stephen Spana, Evangelos Kaisar, and Lili Du. “Logistics Hub 
Location-scheduling Model for Inner-city Last Mile Deliveries.” International Journal for Traffic 
and Transport Engineering 10, no. 2 (2020): 170, doi: 10.7708/ijtte.2020.10(2).04. 
2. Friedman, Lee S. The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 355.  
3. Friedman, Microeconomics, 357. 
4. Friedman, Microeconomics, 357. 
5. Friedman, Microeconomics, 357. 
6. B. Starr McMullen. "Congestion Pricing and Demand Management: A Discussion of the 
Issues." Policy Studies Journal 21, no. 2 (1993): 285-86, 89, doi:10.1111/j.1541-
0072.1993.tb01822.x. 
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PEAK-LOAD PRICING THEORY 
 
There are several kinds of costs associated with peak-load pricing: private costs, 
average costs, and marginal costs. Private costs include any short- or long-term real 
cost or opportunity cost paid by the driver for their personal belongings. This could 
be fuel, car repair costs, time spent sitting in traffic that could have been spent doing 
other things, etc. Average costs in this case include the normal costs to public 
agencies of building, maintaining, and policing the road. The marginal cost in this 
case is the additional driving time of one more vehicle driving on the road.  
  
In Figure 1, the space between O and A represents the private costs to 
drivers, while the space between A and B represents the average costs (and 
marginal costs) to public agencies. At line D1, the demand curve for non-peak 
traffic times, the marginal cost and average costs are the same. We know that traffic 
is not congested because the marginal cost during non-peak times makes each 
vehicle trip cost equal to the next one, up to line C.7  
  
At line C, where congestion increases, so does the marginal cost. Each new 
vehicle added to the road increases congestion. People are spending more time 
sitting in traffic, which increases the marginal cost. The place in the model where 
the marginal cost increases above the average cost is an important opportunity for 
revenue. According to McMullen, “the optimal user fee for a public agency to 
charge is one that makes the total price paid for the vehicle trip equal to its marginal 
cost.”8 Looking back at Figure 1, line D2 represents the vehicle trip demand during 
a peak traffic time. If only the average cost is charged as a user fee, then traffic 
expands to line Q2, which would mean more congestion. However, if the average 
cost plus the marginal cost (GD+DE) is charged as a user fee, then traffic contracts 
to line Q*. Congestion is reduced and the city receives a higher revenue. In this 
scenario, GD is charged as a road tax, but DE is the price of the congestion fee.9 
 
 
7. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 285-86, 89. 
8. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 285-86, 89. 
9. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 285-86, 89. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical peak-load pricing scheme10 
  
It is important to note that peak-load pricing will not reduce traffic 
congestion at high-peak times drastically enough to equal congestion at low-peak 
times.11 However, congestion can be contained while also creating revenue for the 
city. Additionally, utilizing taxes to reduce vehicle traffic congestion can be a 
transparent way to encourage commuters to use public transit, thus increasing 
confidence in government.12 
 
 One reason why drivers might make more trips into a CBD even during 
congestion is an underestimation of their own private costs. Many drivers only 
consider the cost of fuel when calculating their private costs, forgetting to include 
long-term maintenance costs and even the value of their time that could be spent 
elsewhere. Because of this, drivers are more likely to make more trips into and out 
 
10. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 286. 
11. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 286. 
12. Shwu-Ping Guo, and Chaug-Ing Hsu. “Impacts of Transportation External Cost Pricing 
Fare Reductions on Household Mode/Route and Environmental Improvements.” Journal of Urban 
Planning and Development 136, no. 4 (2010): 339-40, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-
5444.0000036. 
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of the CBD, increasing traffic congestion and marginal costs for everyone.13 By 
creating a policy with a visible cost, drivers are more likely to become aware of 
driving costs in addition to fuel costs. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICY APPLICATIONS 
 
The first successfully implemented peak-load pricing policy took effect in 
Singapore in 1975. The Singaporean government began by utilizing a flat-rate 
sticker system to allow entry into the CBD, hoping to reduce traffic congestion 
during peak times by 25-30%. They discovered that traffic congestion was reduced 
by 40% and that public transit users increased. Because the fee was waived for 
carpools of four or more people, a significant increase was seen in these carpools 
as well. On the other hand, travel time increased by 44% during peak times, largely 
because of the increased use of the public transit system. Off-peak traffic also 
increased. Low-income individuals were inconvenienced, indicating that public 
transit fares should be reduced, and the public transit system should be expanded 
to make transportation into CBDs more equitable during peak times.14 Guo and Hsu 
(2010) demonstrated similar findings in their recent comparison of peak-load 
pricing policies and transit fare-reduction policies.15 
 
Technology advances since 1975 have allowed for more cost-effective and 
convenient ways to charge user fees during peak times. In 1983 Hong Kong began 
testing an automatic vehicle identification system (AVI) which allows public 
agencies to identify when vehicles enter CBDs. Then public agencies can mail a 
bill to the driver at the end of the month, rather than requiring an in-person purchase 
or the infrastructure of a toll booth on every street. This system was incredibly 
accurate, even in 1983; however, due to political obstacles, the policy was never 
fully implemented. 16  Politics have also kept road-pricing schemes from being 
implemented in the United States over the years. In most cases, the areas that were 
considering peak-pricing schemes in CBDs or highways received a significant 
amount of negative press, which ultimately caused the projects to fail. For example, 
press coverage of the campaign to implement peak-load pricing policy in the CBD 
of San Francisco in the 1970s focused on some of the controversial aspects of the 
policy and did not discuss the benefits of the policy.17 By working with the press 
 
13. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 289-90. 
14. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 290-91. 
15. Guo and Hsu, “Impacts,” 344-47. 
16. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 291. 
17. McMullen, “Congestion Pricing,” 291. 
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and possibly local businesses to attract positive press that discusses the benefits of 
peak-load pricing policy, Portland may overcome this obstacle. 
 
PORTLAND TRAFFIC AND TRANSIT POLICIES 
 
According to a policy report by Rubin and Mansour (2013) for the Reason 
Foundation, Portland has some unique policies related to transit and traffic. 
Through its unique set of policies, the Portland urbanized area saw a 29% increase 
in unlinked transit passenger trips per capita. The same region saw a 25% increase 
in transit passenger-miles per capita in the same time period.18 However, transit 
usage increases in Portland align with congestion increases. While transit usage 
increase of course does not cause traffic congestion increase, these increases are 
likely caused by the same set of policies.19  
 
One such policy reappropriates funding originally intended to be used for 
highway construction and road improvement to public transport projects. Another 
policy sets specific, explicit city goals to establish high-capacity ratios for city roads 
which ultimately increases traffic congestion.20 A third policy involves prioritizing 
transit system development and preventing construction of new high-capacity 
roads. 21  A fourth policy specifically assigns more than half of combined 
transportation funding to transit (rather than road projects) for the next 15 years 
despite the majority of commuters driving in on roads. These combined policies 
lead to increases in both congestion and transit usage. 22  While it appears that 
Portland was hoping to drive traffic commuters to use public transit instead, this set 
of policies does not seem to have enticed a significant number of drivers to switch 
to transit. Furthermore, these land use policies alone are not as effective as they 
might be if combined with congestion pricing policies, such as peak-load pricing. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PORTLAND 
 
A study using data from Portland, Oregon, sought to empirically test if land use 
planning and congestion pricing support each other in reducing "road congestion 
and other environmental and social externalities associated with driving.”23 The 
 
18. Thomas A. Rubin and Fatma Mansour, “Transit Utilization and Traffic Congestion: Is 
There a Connection?” December 2013, “Case Study: Portland,” http://trid.trb.org/view/1285621. 
19. Rubin and Mansour, “Transit Utilization and Traffic Congestion.” 
20. Rubin and Mansour, “Transit Utilization and Traffic Congestion.” 
21. Rubin and Mansour, “Transit Utilization and Traffic Congestion.” 
22. Rubin and Mansour, “Transit Utilization and Traffic Congestion.” 
23. Zhan Guo, Asha Weinstein Agrawal, and Jennifer Dill, “Are Land Use Planning and 
Congestion Pricing Mutually Supportive?” Journal of the American Planning Association 77, no. 3 
(July 1, 2011): 243, https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2011.592129.  
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results of this study demonstrated that congestion pricing affects congestion more 
effectively in more densely populated areas, such as urban areas, than in less 
densely populated areas, such as suburban areas. Additionally, land use planning 
factors were more heavily influenced by variable-rate fee structures than flat-rate 
fee structures. This means that with land use planning, congestion pricing was more 
helpful for planning land use areas that encouraged people to use transit instead of 
traffic.24 
 
 One important factor to consider when preparing for a peak-load pricing 
policy is determining how you will set pricing policies to accurately reflect time-
dependent traffic patterns and heterogeneous user preferences. Lu, Mahmassani, 
and Zhou (2008) developed a bi-criterion dynamic user equilibrium traffic 
assignment model (BDUE) that captures “traffic dynamics and users’ responses to 
toll charges for the design and evaluation of time-dependent pricing schemes.”25 
Portland should engage in research using this or a similar dynamic user equilibrium 
model in preparing for utilizing a peak-load pricing scheme. 
 
  Other factors to consider when developing a peak-load pricing policy relate 
to land use planning and congestion pricing working together. The first factor to 
consider when structuring the policy is that coordinating congestion pricing with 
current and future land use planning has a sizeable impact on the economic and 
political success of a policy. Another factor is that economic effects include short-
term spillover effects and long-term decisions to relocate based on pricing policies. 
A third factor to consider is that political effects include revenue and spending of 
collected moneys. This might be an issue more often in dense neighborhoods that 
rely more on transit than traffic, thus reducing revenue from congestion pricing and 
increasing transit spending pressures.26  
 
A well-coordinated land use planning and congestion pricing effort is more 
likely to be successful politically than one aggressive initiative of either planning 
or pricing, though the outcomes in terms of revenue and spending may be similar. 
This means that urban planners can either use pricing to best utilize current land 
use patterns or they can plan land use to take best advantage of congestion pricing 
zones. However, "uncoordinated pricing schemes are likely to work against their 
policy objectives by encouraging spillover to areas with lower travel costs, perhaps 
 
24. Guo, Weinstein Agrawal, and Dill, “Land Use Planning and Congestion Pricing,” 243. 
25. Chung-Cheng Lu, Hani S. Mahmassani, and Xuesong Zhou, “A Bi-Criterion Dynamic 
User Equilibrium Traffic Assignment Model and Solution Algorithm for Evaluating Dynamic Road 
Pricing Strategies,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 16, no. 4 (August 1, 
2008): 387, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2007.08.002. 
26. Guo, Weinstein Agrawal, and Dill, “Land Use Planning and Congestion Pricing,” 244. 
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facilitating sprawl.”27 In Portland, this might mean that CBD congestion pricing 
policies need to extend east across the Willamette River to account for traffic hubs 
in East Portland, such as the Moda Center and Lloyd Center areas. 
 
The implication of the study by Guo, Weinstein Agrawal, and Dill (2011) 
is that a well-coordinated pricing and planning scheme is more likely to create 
beneficial behavioral changes than congestion pricing and land use planning 
independent of each other. Since Portland currently utilizes a land use planning 
scheme (intentionally creating traffic congestion in an attempt to reduce the number 
of drivers) and not a coordinated congestion pricing scheme in addition to land use 
planning, the author recommends implementing a coordinated plan involving both 





This study relies on secondary data and analysis, which means that it is subject to 
selection bias and the biases of the authors providing the analysis. This has been 
accounted for by the author as much as possible in applying previous analyses but 





There are many reasons why peak-load pricing in CBDs is a good policy, including 
reducing single-driver vehicles that increase congestion, helping the environment, 
and increasing environmental and transportation equity throughout the city. Single-
driver trucks completing last mile deliveries in particular add to negative 
environmental impacts and increases in traffic congestion.28 On the other hand, a 
reduction in traffic congestion would lead to lower urban temperatures, thus 
reducing the effect of the urban heat island and creating more equitable 
environmental impacts in urban areas like Downtown Portland.29 Additionally, if 
there is sufficient public transit infrastructure available, transportation equity will 
increase under a peak-load pricing policy in the CBD, especially if combined with 
 
27. Guo, Weinstein Agrawal, and Dill, “Land Use Planning and Congestion Pricing,” 244. 
28. Charisis et al., “Logistics Hub,” 169. 
29. Haddad Louiza, Aouachria Zéroual and Haddad Djamel. “Impact of the Transport on the 
Urban Heat Island.” International Journal for Traffic and Transport Engineering 5, 3(2015): 252-
53, doi:10.7708/ijtte.2015.5(3).03. 
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current land use planning policies. 30  Most importantly, it will relieve traffic 
congestion in Downtown Portland and provide the city with additional revenue for 
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